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other human persons than nonhuman physical objects is promising. I
hope someone will soon do a good job of defending them.!
NOTES
1. For helpful comments on earlier drafts I am grateful to Frances
Howard-Snyder.

The Problem of Hell, by Jonathan L. Kvanvig. New York: Oxford University
Press, 1993. Pp.viii and 182. $24.95 (cloth).
FRANCES HOWARD-SNYDER, Western Washington University
An instance of the problem of evil, the problem of hell is particularly troubling for theism, since hell is a terrible thing, the worst thing that can happen to anyone, and unlike other kinds of suffering, one for which the sufferer cannot be compensated in the long run. Why would a perfectly loving
God permit people to suffer such evil? Why indeed would He condemn
them to it? Jonathan Kvanvig explores the tension between hell and any
form of theism which conceives of God as perfectly good. But he discusses
the problem primarily from the point of view of Christianity. He motivates
the problem by describing and rejecting a number of traditional accounts of
hell. In the latter half of the book he offers an account of his own and
attempts to show that it avoids the difficulties that faced the other accounts.
He begins by discussing the 'strong view' of hell. This, he believes, is the
standard view of hell, although he believes that scripture neither explicitly
endorses it nor entails it. The strong view has four components:
(H1) The Anti-Universalism Thesis: Some persons are consigned
to hell;
(H2) The Existence Thesis: Hell is a place where people exist, if
they are consigned there;
(H3) The No Escape Thesis: There is no possibility of leaving hell
and nothing one can do to change, or become in order to get out of
hell, once one is consigned there; and
(H4) The Retribution Thesis: The justification for hell is retributive
in nature, hell being constituted to mete out punishment to those
whose earthly lives and behavior warrant it. [19]
Interestingly, this list doesn't mention the fact that hell is unpleasant or otherwise bad. Perhaps that is too obvious to need mentioning. He also
assumes, but doesn't include here, that all human beings deserve hell. This
claim makes trouble for the strong view, but he doesn't consider rejecting it.
He discusses two versions of the strong view. The first (the 'equal punishment version') claims that all sinners receive the same punishment; the second (the 'differential punishment version') that, although all sinners receive
everlasting punishment, some are made to suffer worse than others. He criticizes the first as being both unfair and unjust, "unfair, because not everyone
is equally guilty; unjust, because not all sin, if any, deserves an infinite pun-
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ishment" [27]. The unfairness might be easily remedied by shifting to the differential version of hell, according to which more vicious sinners receive
more severe punishment. But that leaves the objection that, no matter what a
person did on earth, condemning her to everlasting suffering is unjust.
What justifies us in imposing retributive punishment to some degree or
other? The answer will have to do with how much harm has been done
and with the intentions of the wrongdoer. But it seems that few of us (in
fact, probably none of us) have done sufficient harm with sufficiently bad
. intent to warrant infinite punishment. Some have argued all sin is sin
against God and that, since God is greater than other beings, sin against
God is correspondingly worse than sin against creatures. In fact, since God
is infinitely good, sin against God is infinitely bad.
Kvanvig agrees that all sin is sin against God (since God sustains the
lives of all creatures an injury to one of them is a sin against Him - just as
parents' intimate involvement with their baby means that an injury to the
child injures them.) But he rejects the idea that "guilt is proportional to the
status of the injured party." He supports this with human analogies. For
example, the fact that Gandhi was a better person than some ordinary Joe
wouldn't make it worse to slap Gandhi than Joe.
Kvanvig spends much of his time elaborating and refuting the view,
which derives from Jonathan Edwards, that all sinners are equally deserving of punishment because all sin is equally evil. He points out some sins
are less evil than others, and even if all sins harm God, those sins which
have God as their intentional object seem significantly worse than sins
done by people who have no idea that God exists, or that their action will
harm Him. But one needn't argue that all sin is equally deserving of the
ultimate punishment in order to argue that all sinners are equally deserving. All one needs to argue is that there is a class of sins ('mortal sins,' perhaps) such that we've all committed at least one member of this class and
that one of them is enough to qualify one for the worst punishment.
Moreover, Kvanvig notes that the strong view of hell doesn't require the
equal punishment view. An advocate of the strong view can claim that the
degree of punishment we deserve varies according to how much harm we
cause and according to how malicious or indifferent our motives, but can
still argue that each of those who will go to hell have committed sins so
pernicious that she or he deserves some sort of everlasting punishment.
Against the differential punishment version Kvanvig merely claims that
"the intentions of the individual are of critical importance in determining
the punishment due. If the death was an accident, perhaps no punishment
is due. If the death was premeditated, a severe punishment is due" [62]. He
believes, however, that the differential punishment version of the strong
view "fails in that it ignores the intentional realm when assigning a basic
sentence for a wrong done" [63].
But the differential version of the strong view needn't face this difficulty. Its advocates could argue that each of us at some time or another commits a sin which involves conscious deliberate rebellion against God. Some
of these sins are worse than others, or some of us commit more such sins
than others do, and that is why some of us deserve more severe punishment than others, but all of us deserve some everlasting punishment.

444

Faith and Philosophy

Kvanvig points out that some of us don't even believe that God exists. For
such people, fully conscious rebellion against God would not be possible. It
isn't clear whether either of these claims is true. The second seems doubtful
when one considers the atheist who claims, "I don't believe that God exists.
But if he does, I hate Him!" However, if Kvanvig is right in thinking that
some people are incapable of the ultimate rebellion against God, and even
if no sin short of such rebellion deserves everlasting punishment, the advocate of the strong view can hang onto the strong view and just drop the
claim that all of us deserve to go to hell.
Kvanvig next investigates variants of the strong view of hell, each of
which drops one of theses HI-H4. He elaborates these views in turn and
raises difficulties for them. First there is the view which denies the Existence
Thesis. This would be the view that hell is simply non-existence. Instead of
suffering eternal damnation, sinners are condemned to annihilation.
Kvanvig finds this unpromising. Why should we prefer annihilation to eternallife in hell? As long as we are gripped by a picture of hell as a place of
torture, the answer is obvious. But, Kvanvig claims, hell needn't be like that.
Clearly we needn't think of hell as a place of physical torture. But suppose it is better to stay alive in hell than to be annihilated. Being in hell,
then, is better than not existing, and better, presumably, than never having
been born. But in that case, the problem of hell is less pressing than we
thought initially. Certainly some human beings live lives which are so bad
that the suffering in them outweighs the good in them, and of which we
might well say that it would have been better for them had they never
existed. In that case, hell would not be the worst thing that can happen to
a person. Moreover, if one's existence in hell were better than no existence,
the chief problem with hell would be that it isn't heaven, but God's failure
to let everyone into heaven seems to beless problematic than His allowing
some to suffer intolerably. So Kvanvig's objection to the annihilation
account conflicts with his overall project.
The second alternative denies the No Escape Thesis. It allows that, after
our life on earth, we will have other chances to redeem ourselves from hell.
Kvanvig objects that this doesn't solve the problem. If cutting off a thief's
hand is an unjust punishment, then so is cutting off his hand unless he
apologizes.
The third alternative denies the Anti-Universalism Thesis. It claims that
everyone is eventually reconciled to God and no-one ends up in hell.
Kvanvig discusses two versions of this view: contingent universalism and
necessary universalism, and argues that both fail. According to contingent
universalism, hell is contingently unoccupied, although it is possibly occupied. Kvanvig raises the modal problem of hell for this view. God is not merely perfectly good, but necessarily perfectly good. If God's perfect goodness
prevents Him from consigning people to hell, then His necessary perfect
goodness prevents Him from consigning them to hell in any possible world.
Necessary universalism, on the other hand, rules out human freedom. If
we will necessarily be united with God, then we will necessarily be morally perfected, and hence, we will have no choice in the matter. Kvanvig discusses three objections to this argument: God could not create free beings
who would ultimately reject Him, freedom is not as important as we have

BOOK REVIEWS

445

sometimes thought and should be overridden if necessary to prevent everlasting perdition; and no-one could freely reject God forever. Kvanvig
responds to all three of these objections. I shall concentrate on his discussion of the second.
In response to the objection that God would justifiably override someone's freedom in order to prevent her from doing irreparable harm to herself, just as a loving father would justifiably prevent his daughter from
committing suicide, Kvanvig argues that the mere fact that suicide is
irreparable harm is not enough to justify interference. If the daughter really
knows what she wants and would_not come to change her mind, and the
father knows this, then he ought to let her go ahead. Of course, in almost
every case, a father should prevent his child from committing suicide. But
what is true of a human parent may not always be true of God. Human
parents don't fully understand the minds of their children. They don't
know exactly why their children are contemplating suicide, whether the
decision is a rational one, whether they will come to change their minds
later on (if they are rescued) and so on. Given this ignorance, they ought to
err on the side of caution. But these constra,ints don't apply to God. "Hence
the fact that sometimes freedom can be infringed upon legitimately does
not show that God should infringe upon the freedom on any person headed for hell..." [85].
Kvanvig points out that we don't always think it right to interfere with a
suicide, for example, in the case of those who are dying and suffering
intense and unending pain. One might object here that we respond this
way because we recognize that the suffering is objectively horrible and that
suicide would be the rational thing for anyone in those circumstances.
Going to heaven, by contrast, is objectively better than going to hell. So we
don't empathize with the sinner's choice, and hence, aren't inclined to
judge it rational. Kvanvig believes that what justifies our non-interference
is not simply the fact that death is objectively better than intense pain, but
the patient's belief that it is and the fact that the belief is rational and stable.
Kvanvig says it is crucial whether the suicidal person would agree that we
should have intervened when he comes to see things more clearly.
He says in a footnote that if God did override the freedom of the rebellious, then she would either experience her chains as painful, as God
would have to be constantly reining her in, or else God would have to do
something equivalent to lobotomizing her, radically reducing her capacities, so that she was less than a full human being.
This is false. Consider the state of one of the blessed in heaven, Joan of
Arc, say. It seems plausible she is no longer free with respect to whether
she loves God. She has freely formed her character in such a way that she
is unable to reject God. Now consider Hitler, who we might plausibly suppose to be in hell. But also suppose that he could have freely chosen to put
himself into a situation like that of Joan. Consider the state that he would
now be in as a result of such a free choice. That state would not involve
present suffering, nor would it involve any reduction of his capacities, or
dulling of his sensibilities, nor would it include the possibility of future
rebellion. Now surely God could put Hitler into that state (or one that is
molecule for molecule identical to that state). If He did so, Hitler's love
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would not be freely given, and hence would be inferior to Joan's love, but
Hitler would not suffer, nor would his capacities be reduced. The only difference between this Hitler and the one who (counterfactually) freely chose
to love God, is an historical difference. This Hitler arrived at his heavenly
state by a different (and less ideal) route than the other. Moreover, suppose
God does do this. W ouldn' t the resultant Hitler come to thank God for
doing so? If so, isn't this enough, by Kvanvig's criterion, to judge that
God's interference was justified?
The final simple alternative that Kvanvig considers abandons the view
that hell is retribution for earthly sins. He discusses views according to
which God does not put sinners into hell out of retribution, but they put
themselves into hell by rejecting God. He writes: "On Swinburne's view,
one's continued presence is hell is not due to something that occurred in
the earthly past but rather to the present condition of having lost one's
soul. One's residence in hell is eternal, not because one has done something
to deserve it, but rather because it is impossible for one to achieve the alterations required to leave"[991.
But how, Kvanvig asks, is it impossible? Is God unable to change it? No.
But if not, why is He justified in not doing so? Kvanvig agrees with
Swinburne in rejecting the retribution thesis, but he thinks that the strong
view needs a more fundamental overhauling. The retribution thesis seems
in some kind of tension with God's love. Why does God create us? Because
He is essentially loving. Why does God want us to go to heaven? Because
He loves us and wants us to enjoy Him and to flourish. Why does God
send sinners to hell? Because they are evil and God wants to punish them;
or, because they deserve it and He is perfectly just. Kvanvig feels that these
last answers jar in light of the answers to the first questions.
Swinburne and others attribute two motives to God and offer no explanation as to why one predominates in one case, but not in the other.
Compare: Joe loves ice-cream, but he wants to lose weight. Why did he
refuse to eat that ice-cream but eat this one? It is not enough to say that he
refused the first ice-cream because he wanted to lose weight, and that he
ate the second one because he loved ice-cream. A full explanation would
explain why one desire overrode the other in each case. This is particularly
urgent if one wants to explain the behavior of a perfectly rational agent.
Kvanvig wants an explanation which will make God's treatment of the
damned consistent with His treatment of the righteous, show how both
issue from the same essential character, or give some explanation as to why
one aspect of God's character motivates in one case but not in the other.
Such an explanation would be "an issuant view of hell." In particular, he
argues, the explanation must issue from God's love. This does not imply
that God must ignore or abandon justice. "I am arguing for a hierarchical
conception of the divine motivations, where God's love is His fundamental
motivation regarding human beings and according to which God expends
great effort to satisfy the demands of justice and holiness without abandoning that love for us" [119].
In chapter 3, he gives a fuller account of issuant conceptions, and evaluates two such conceptions: the first due to C. S. Lewis; the second to
Eleonore Stump. Lewis says that sinners choose hell, by voluntarily surren-
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dering their will to their passions, and in the process, losing their humanity. This is very dose to the view Kvanvig himself adopts, but he wonders
why Lewis doesn't think that those in hell ultimately annihilate themselves. Lewis sees sinners in hell as becoming less and less human, in fact,
simply becoming less and less. A natural extension of this is to see them as
fading out of existence. But he is reluctant to go this route, probably
because he feels it is unorthodox, and offers an argument which relies on
something like the law of conservation of energy. Kvanvig rightly points
out that such natural laws wouldn't limit God's power, and Lewis's
thought here is inconsistent with the doctrine of creation ex nihilo. Stump
elaborates the Thomistic picture of hell as a place of quarantine, where sinners are kept isolated from the blessed. Aquinas believed that being is
always better than non-being. Even if someone chose non-being, God is
justified in overriding her choice and keeping her in existence. But if He is
justified in overriding her free choice in order to keep her in the higher
state of existence rather than non-existence, why isn't He justified in overriding her free choice by forcing her to live.in heaven?
This raises a question which needs to be settled if one wants an adequate account of hell: "the primary issue .. is whether freedom or existence
is of fundamental importance" [137]. Kvanvig explores this question by
considering two earthly analogies: is life-imprisonment or exile a less harsh
punishment than death, and when, if ever, is one justified in allowing
someone else to commit suicide?
We tend to think that life-imprisonment is better than execution. This
suggests that annihilating the damned is worse than putting (or leaving)
them in hell. The analogy fails, however, as Kvanvig points out. Most modern prisons provide their inmates with many ingredients of a valuable life:
decent food, company, reading materials, exercise, etc. If the choice were
between execution and life with no possibility of parole in a prison where
one was deprived of all the good things of life, for example, if prisoners
were locked in a pitch black cell too small for movement without company,
warmth, and so on, then death would be attractive. Presumably, hell
would not contain any of the good things of life.
At the same time, we sometimes think it overly paternalistic to prevent
someone who has arrived at a completely rational decision to commit suicide from doing so. Kvanvig thinks that someone who rejects God is choosing suicide. Since God is omnipresent, to choose to be separated from God
is to choose to be nowhere, hence, to choose not to exist (and also, he might
argue, since God sustains all things in existence, to choose to be independent from God is to choose not to be sustained in existence.) Kvanvig
thinks this choice might in some cases be rational. So God would be overly
paternalistic in preventing people from destroying themselves.
Kvanvig's own view of hell emerges. He believes that hell is not a punishment which God imposes on sinners because of their sins. Instead, sinners choose to reject God, to be independent from God. This choice, if
taken to its logical extreme, leads to self-annihilation. God respects this
choice, first, in not forcing Himself upon them, not changing their wills so
that they cannot help but love Him. This leaves them in a state of rebellion
against God, wretched, angry and confused. They stay in this state for as

448

Faith and Philosophy

long as it takes them to see their choices clearly and to come to a final rational and settled choice between God and annihilation. If they never arrive at
this final choice, they remain in this state forever. If they come to change
their minds and decide to return to God, they do so. (It is unclear whether
this ever happens or whether it is even possible.) If they do arrive at the
final decision to reject God completely and so embrace non-existence, and
it meets the requirements for rationality and God is in a position to judge
that it meets the requirements, then God allows them to destroy themselves finally. (It is unclear whether this ever happens either.)
If God's love would really direct Him to allow people to reject Him and
prevent Him from forcing His love on them, then the same love would
lead Him to respect their final choice to annihilate themselves. But would
God's love direct Him to allow people to reject Him? Is it true that "In loving a person, one must be willing to suffer even total loss in allowing
another to pursue what they most deeply want"? [153].
If you love someone and she wants something which will injure her,
then you have to choose between respecting her autonomy and keeping
her from harm. Which does love require that you choose? Suppose
Kvanvig's five year old dislikes school and has a settled and (given his
capacities) rational desire not to attend school, but to stay at home and
watch TV and eat ice-cream. Obviously, loving a five year old requires that
one look out for his interests rather than respect his autonomy. But why?
Why is this the appropriate response when dealing with a five year old,
but not the appropriate response when dealing with an adult (even a perverse and not very smart adult)? Is there something intrinsically satisfactory about the mental, social and psychological level of an eighteen year old
which justifies our respecting her choices when we wouldn't respect the
choices of her five year old brother? It isn't clear that there is. But there are
two other important considerations. The first is that the five year old is
going to grow up and see things a lot more reasonably, whereas the adult
is not going to change much. We allow twenty-one year olds and even
eighteen year olds to make their own decisions, but if a significant mental
and physical development, comparable. to the development that occurs
between five and eighteen, occurred between eighteen and thirty-one and
then levelled off, it seems that we wouldn't allow eighteen year olds to
make their own decisions, but would make thirty one the age of consent.
Guardians of young children protect them until they reach their full development, in part because it seems unfair to the potential adult to allow her
future to be ruined by the immature person that she temporarily is.
Another reason for the difference is that, except for the deranged and
retarded, one adult is roughly on the same level of maturity as another,
whereas an adult is clearly at a different level from the child. There is
something objectionably patronizing about saying to another adult: "From
my exalted position, I judge that your choice about what is in your interest
is wrong." This seems inappropriate given the sort of equality and respect
necessary to love between adults. But an adult can say something of this
sort to a child without insulting him. So love in itself doesn't require
respecting the choices of another. Other conditions have to be met as well.
First, the beloved has to have reached roughly the final level of her devel-
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opment, and secondly, the beloved and the lover have to be on roughly the
same level of maturity. But neither of these conditions seems to be met in
the case at hand. If certain accounts of heaven are correct, our life there is
not static but involves considerable development, as we get closer and
closer to God. In that case, before one has entered heaven one has not
reached anything like one's full potential. A ten year old hasn't reached his
full potential and that seems to be a good part of why it would be wrong to
allow him to destroy his mind with drugs. By the same token, human
beings on earth Qr in hell haven't reached their full potential. Moreover,
relative to God, human adults are like little children. There is nothing
objectionably patronizing about a father saying to his five year old, "Sorry,
kid. I know what's good for you. You're going to school whether you like it
or not." Similarly there may be nothing objectionably patronizing about
God saying to a human being, "Sorry, kid. I know what's good for you.
You're going to heaven whether you like it or not." Indeed, Christians frequently offer such explanations for why God doesn't answer our prayers,
but instead allows us to suffer something horrible but character-forming.
These two factors may justify God in forcing people into heaven if they
refuse to go freely. (I am not here presupposing a geographic conception of
heaven, as a place where God could keep the sinner, in spite of the fact that
she hates being there. But I'm imagining God altering the sinner's will in
such a way that she would unfreely love Him and enjoy being in heaven.)
This line of argument will no doubt be repugnant to Kvanvig and to a
number of writers on the problem of evil and the problem of divine hiddenness, who appeal to the value of freedom to justify the fact that God
allows hUH!an beings to suffer or to remain ignorant of Him. But what
does the value of freedom consist in? And how great is this value? There is
no doubt that freedom is valuable. Freely given love is better than coerced
love. Freely arrived at virtue is better than coerced virtue. Suppose, as is
plausible, thatthe highest state for human beings is to love God freely. God
cannot guarantee that everyone attain this state. What, then, is the second
best state for us: freely arrived at rebellion against God, or coerced love of
God? Why should we think that the former is preferable? Does freedom
have infinite va}ue, enpt£gh to outweigh. the infinite evil of eternal separation from God? WhyW6uld one thinkirnis? This question needs an answer.
Here are a couple of suggestions.
'
One direct response would defend the value of freedom, Perhaps one
might argue that no-one could truly be said to love God freely if God were
to guarantee that everyone would love Him in the end. If one cannot do
otherwise than love God, then one does not love God freely. In that case,
since the highest possible state for a human being is to love God freely,
then perhaps God would be justified in allowing some to reject Him ultimately in order to make the highest state possible for others, But the
Principle of Alternate Possibilities is widely thought to be false, and it
seems particularly implausible in this case. God could allow human beings
a long time in which to choose whether to love Him freely, before interfering with their choices. Those who chose to love Him during this interim
period would have chosen to do so freely, whereas those who rejected Him
during this period would be capable only of the lesser 'coerced love.'!
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Another response would reject the assumptions implied by the questions. One might argue that the questions embody the consequentialist
assumption that a perfectly good God must produce the best of all possible
worlds (available to Him). Together with the claim that coerced love is better than free rejection and ultimate self-destruction, this implies that God
would coerce people to love Him if they do not do so freely. Someone who
rejects this consequentialist assumption might argue that there are certain
constraints on what may morally be done in pursuit of the best available
state of affairs. These constraints are imposed by love itself. Perfect love
involves respect for the autonomy of the beloved which prevents the lover
from interfering even for the good of the beloved. I suspect that Kvanvig
would take this line, but in that case, he needs to respond to the argument I
mounted earlier. Respect for autonomy is not an absolute constraint. It
doesn't apply in the case of children, and the reasons it does apply in the
case of love between adults may not transfer to the case of love between
God and human beings. I think more work needs to be done in this area.
In spite of my complaints about his arguments, I find Kvanvig's account
attractive in a number of ways. He explains heaven and hell in terms of
God's love for His creatures. This makes God's behavior rational, consistent and comprehensible. It also makes Him look less vindictive than some
of the competing conceptions do. It explains the Christian notion that belief
in God (in the sense of commitment to God) is necessary and (given certain
background conditions) sufficient for salvation. 2 It explains why heaven
and hell constitute the only two ultimate destinies for human beings.
Alternative accounts make it appear arbitrary that those are the only two
options.
The book is very well-organized and contains many arguments about
side-issues, such as .divine command morality, which I haven't discussed
here. Most of the arguments are very good and are interesting in their own
right apart from the contribution they make to the book's conclusion. I
highly recommend this book. 3
NOTES
1. If you think' coerced love' is a contradiction in terms, then imagine God
coerces people into a state which is molecule for molecule identical with love
except that it is not freely arrived at.
2. It may be objected that if God's love, by itself, makes it the case that
commitment to God is necessary and sufficient for salvation, then Christ's life,
suffering and death seem unnecessary.
3. I am grateful to Daniel Howard-Snyder for discussion of the issues
involved here and to Jonathan Kvanvig for comments.

